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Learning theories of depression have proposed that depressive cognitions, such as
negative thoughts with reference to oneself, can develop through a reinforcement
learning mechanism. This negative self-reference is considered to be positively
reinforced by rewarding experiences such as genuine support from others after
negative self-disclosure, and negatively reinforced by avoidance of potential aversive
situations. The learning account additionally predicts that negative self-reference would
be maintained by an inability to adjust one’s behavior when negative self-reference
no longer leads to such reward. To test this prediction, we designed an adapted
version of the reversal-learning task. In this task, participants were reinforced to choose
and engage in either negative or positive self-reference by probabilistic economic
reward and punishment. Although participants were initially trained to choose negative
self-reference, the stimulus-reward contingencies were reversed to prompt a shift
toward positive self-reference (Study 1) and a further shift toward negative self-reference
(Study 2). Model-based computational analyses showed that depressive symptoms
were associated with a low learning rate of negative self-reference, indicating a high
level of reward expectancy for negative self-reference even after the contingency
reversal. Furthermore, the difficulty in updating outcome predictions of negative
self-reference was significantly associated with the extent to which one possesses
negative self-images. These results suggest that difficulty in adjusting action-outcome
estimates for negative self-reference increases the chance to be faced with negative
aspects of self, which may result in depressive symptoms.
Keywords: self-reference, depression, reinforcement learning, Q-learning model, rumination
INTRODUCTION
Four decades of studies have shown that individuals with clinical and subclinical depressive
symptoms have a negativity bias in self-referent information processing. Cognitive models of
depression have highlighted the negative views of the self, the world, and the future as the cognitive
triad of depression (e.g., Beck, 1976; Ingram, 1990). Dysfunctions in self-referent information
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 August 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1333
fpsyg-08-01333 July 29, 2017 Time: 15:41 # 2
Iijima et al. Stuttering Thoughts
processing have gained particular attention in social and clinical
psychology, as early studies demonstrated that an excessive
degree of self-focused attention is correlated with increased
levels of depressive symptoms (e.g., Smith and Greenberg,
1981; Ingram and Smith, 1984). More recent studies have
confirmed that negative automatic thoughts and biases in
attention, interpretation, and memory are associated with
depression (Mathews and MacLeod, 2005; Gotlib and Joormann,
2010; LeMoult et al., 2016), particularly when the stimuli are
self-relevant or processed in a self-relevant manner (e.g., Mogg
and Bradley, 2005; Joormann and Tran, 2009).
Other studies have suggested that individuals with depressive
symptoms tend to lack a positivity bias that non-depressed
individuals have; although people generally tend to attribute
positive (rather than negative) matters to internal, stable,
and global factors, this tendency is weak or absent in
people with depressive symptoms (Mezulis et al., 2004).
The positivity bias could function protectively to divert
attention away from negative information and to direct it to
positive information; therefore shielding people from negative
self-referent processing and preserving positive self-views (Gotlib
et al., 1988; McCabe and Gotlib, 1995; McCabe et al., 2000).
Excessive focus on negative aspects of the self (i.e., negative
self-referent processing) and lack of focus on its positive
aspects is associated with unbalanced accessibility of negative
and positive self-referent materials, thereby contributing to
depressive rumination (e.g., Trew, 2011).
Despite a large number of studies that have investigated
the altered emotional self-referent processing in depression, the
mechanisms underlying the self-negativity biases and the absence
of self-positivity biases are still subjects of ongoing debate. How
should we understand these biases? One important aspect, and
the focus of the current study, is the inflexibility in adjusting
cognition and behavior to a changing environment. Previous
studies have suggested that individuals with depressive symptoms
tend to have difficulty refreshing working memory by eliminating
information that is no longer relevant (Joormann and Gotlib,
2008; Levens and Gotlib, 2010; Pe et al., 2016), inhibiting negative
information processing (Joormann, 2004; Goeleven et al., 2006),
and disengaging current attention from negative stimuli (Koster
et al., 2005; Mogg and Bradley, 2005; Leyman et al., 2007). Such
cognitive inflexibility in updating attention and memory explains
why people with depressive symptoms experience difficulty in
stopping their negative self-referent thinking.
The updating function has also been examined from a learning
perspective, suggesting that the inability to update a current belief
on action-outcome contingencies is associated with heightened
levels of depressive and anxiety symptoms. If individuals with
high levels of depressive symptoms are provided with inaccurate
instructions about how to succeed at a learning task, they
showed persistent and problematic rule-following behaviors
throughout the task (McAuliffe et al., 2014). Similarly, trait
anxiety is associated with the inability to update action-outcome
estimates following unexpected aversive outcomes (Browning
et al., 2015). These findings suggest that individuals with
depression (and anxiety) symptoms have difficulty in adjusting
their beliefs in a volatile environment (where the outcomes
are not static but are changeable) once these beliefs have been
learned and established. Such inflexibility in updating beliefs or
action-outcome predictions could well explain the development
and maintenance processes of self-negativity bias in depression,
since it is possible that (a) negative self-referent thinking is
learned and reinforced, and that (b) negative self-reference is
persistently perceived to be accompanied with reward even after
environmental changes.
Indeed, the learning theory of depression suggests that
the development of depressive cognitions can be explained
by reinforcement learning principles (Watkins and Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2014; Ramnerö et al., 2015). More precisely, this
account holds that the repeated presentation of reward after a
negative thought will increase the frequency of such negative
thoughts. Although negative self-referent thinking has clear
adverse consequences, such as increasing negative affect, negative
self-reference can be perceived to have beneficial outcomes that
function as reward in specific contexts. For example, complaining
and expressing negative aspects of the self may be initially
reinforced by the genuine support and concern of other people
(e.g., Ramnerö et al., 2015), even if excessive disclosure about
negative aspects of the self might cause fatigue and social
rejection by others in a long-term relationship (Coyne, 1976).
Self-focused thinking may also be perceived as a means to
enhance self-knowledge and to generate possible solutions in
difficult situations. In line with this, self-reflection may indeed
help understand oneself and analyze problems accurately (e.g.,
Trapnell and Campbell, 1999; Watkins, 2008).
In addition to positive reinforcement, negative reinforcement
might also play an important role in the development of
self-negativity bias in depression. It has been argued that
depressive rumination (a repetitive and persistent form of
negative self-focused thinking) functions as an act of avoidance,
which can temporally reduce emotional distresses by preventing
even more aversive situations and the responsibility to take action
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Watkins and Nolen-Hoeksema,
2014). However, such avoidance also prevents actual problem-
solving and the opportunity to experience that certain situations
may actually be not so aversive or even rewarding, thereby
sometimes contributing to the depressed state in the long-term
(Jacobson et al., 2001; Ramnerö et al., 2015).
Models of reinforcement learning propose that the efficiency
of the updating function can be represented by a parameter
that quantifies the learning rate. In the reinforcement-learning
framework, an agent (a) predicts reward values of action
candidates (e.g., pressing a right vs. a left key), (b) selects an
action that maximizes the predicted reward value (e.g., amount
of juice or money), and (c) updates the predictions according
to the consequences of the action (e.g., Daw and Doya, 2006;
Corrado and Doya, 2007; O’Doherty et al., 2007). Learning
progresses through minimizing the mismatch between the actual
and predicted outcomes of an action (i.e., prediction error)
and maximizing the predicted value that is associated with
the current action. In other words, the current action-outcome
estimate is determined by the previous prediction error, which is
weighted by a learning rate that varies depending on individual
and environmental factors. The learning rate becomes smaller
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when an agent is less sensitive to environmental changes, that
is, when the agent’s action-outcome estimates are more slowly
updated. In the present study, we hypothesized that individuals
with depressive symptoms would have a low learning rate for
negative self-reference. A low learning rate represents difficulty in
discarding the learned beliefs that negative self-reference brings
beneficial outcomes even when the actual outcomes are harmful.
Such inflexible adjustment in action-outcome predictions would
contribute to the excessive use of negative self-reference.
Therefore, we designed a laboratory model that allowed
studying the development and maintenance of the self-negativity
bias. More specifically, we examined the relationship between
individual differences in depressive symptoms and the learning
of associations between emotional self-reference and related
reward by using an adapted version of the probabilistic reversal
learning (RL) task. In a typical RL task, participants are offered
two options, one associated with higher probability of reward
and the other associated with higher probability of punishment.
Over the course of training, participants learn which response
instrumentally generates a reward (Izquierdo and Jentsch, 2012).
However, in the middle of the task, the stimulus-reward
contingencies are reversed. As the trained response no longer
results in a reward, participants have to discount the outcome
prediction of the option that was initially a “correct” response and
have to switch to the other response.
In our adapted version of the RL task, participants were offered
two emotional (negative vs. positive) options. Depending on
their choice, participants were expected to engage in negative
or positive self-reference (Figure 1). More precisely, participants
were presented with a self-attribute that had the same valence
as their choice, and were asked to rate to what extent the self-
attribute was applicable to them (Tamir and Mitchell, 2012;
Takano et al., 2016). For example, if a participant chose the
“positive” option, they had to rate the applicability of a positive
attribute (e.g., “Happy”). Immediately after the rating, either a
reward or punishment was presented probabilistically, depending
on the participant’s valence choice. In the acquisition phase,
participants learned that the “negative” option was more likely
to generate a reward than the “positive” counterpart; however,
in the reversal phase, the “negative” option was no longer
the correct response, and was more likely to be followed by
punishment. To perform this task well, participants had to update
the outcome prediction of negative self-reference efficiently after
the contingency reversal. As described above, we predicted that
depressive symptoms would be associated with a significant delay
in updating the outcome prediction of negative self-reference.
This hypothesis was tested in two studies using the emotional
RL task. In Study 1, participants were initially trained to choose
negative self-reference (acquisition phase), following which,
they were to choose positive self-reference to obtain reward
(reversal phase). This task allowed us to examine the process of
discounting the reward prediction of negative self-reference in
the reversal phase. However, because Study 1 did not cover the
transition from positive to negative self-reference, we could not
examine the re-learning process of negative-reward associations
(i.e., increasing the reward prediction of negative self-reference).
This was particularly important for individuals with higher levels
of depressive symptoms, who were expected to have greater
preference toward negative self-reference already during initial
trials of the acquisition phase. Therefore, in Study 2, we added
the second reversal phase, in which participants were trained to
choose negative self-reference again after being trained to choose
positive self-reference.
As an additional hypothesis, we tested the mediational role
of self-image in the association between the updating of reward
prediction and the level of depressive symptoms. We predicted
that difficulty in updating reward prediction for negative self-
reference would be associated with more negative self-images
(e.g., because persistently collecting and therefore being exposed
to negative self-referent information leads to negative self-views
and/or decreases positive self-views) and that the reinforced
negative self-views may contribute to depressive symptoms. More
precisely, we hypothesized that the association between the low
learning rate for negative self-reference and depressive symptoms
would be mediated by a more negative (and less positive) self-
image (i.e., by a higher applicability rating score for negative
attributes and a lower score for positive attributes during the
emotional RL task).
STUDY 1
Method
Participants
Thirty-nine participants (16 men and 23 women; mean
age = 19.6 years, SD = 2.8 years) were recruited from a large
sample pool of undergraduate students from the University of
Tokyo. No specific inclusion/exclusion criteria were used.
Measure
Participants completed the Japanese version of the Center for
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977;
Shima et al., 1985), which is a 20-item self-report questionnaire
that measures the levels of depressive symptoms during the
previous week. Each item describes a typical symptom of
depression and is rated on a four-point scale of the frequency
of occurrence ranging from 0 (less than 1 day) to 3 (5–7 days).
The mean CES-D score was 11.9 (SD = 7.9) and the Cronbach’s
α was 0.88. Ten participants had clinically significant levels of
symptoms, which exceeded the cut-off score of the CES-D (>15;
Radloff, 1977).
The Baseline Task
Before performing the emotional and neutral RL tasks,
participants completed a baseline task (Figure 1A) to assess the
preference for negative self-reference that participants originally
had. In this task, participants were presented with a positive
and a negative valence option. They were asked to choose either
of the two options, following which an attribute corresponding
to the selected valence was displayed (if the “positive” option
was selected, an attribute, such as “Happy,” was presented).
Participants were instructed to rate the extent to which the
presented attribute was applicable to them on a five-point scale
ranging from (1) not at all to (5) very much. Therefore, if
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic flow of a single trial in the baseline (A), emotional (B) and neutral (C) reversal learning tasks. In each experiment, the participants performed
the baseline task (A), in which they selected the preferred valence (“negative” vs. “positive”) for the following self-referent rating [e.g., Questions such as “Happy?” (or
“Unhappy?”) were displayed if the “positive” (or “negative”) option were selected]. In the emotional reversal learning task (B), participants selected the preferred
valence for the following self-referent rating and, subsequently, monetary reward (+5 JPY) or punishment (–5 JPY) was presented probabilistically, depending on the
participants’ valence choices. The reinforcement schedules have been presented in Figure 2. In the neutral reversal learning task (C), the participants choose
between the letters “A” and “B”, which was rewarded or punished according to the same reinforcement schedule used in the emotional RL task. JPY, Japanese yen.
a participant preferred negative self-reference, he/she would
choose the “negative” option more frequently than the “positive”
option. When making the preference choices, participants were
informed only of the valence types (i.e., “Negative” vs. “Positive”),
but the specific content of the attributes (e.g., “Unhappy” vs.
“Happy”) was blinded until the attribute-rating display appeared.
Participants completed 20 trials in the baseline task.
We used a list of negative and positive attributes, a subset of
which was used in a previous study (Takano et al., 2016). The
list comprised 100 pairs of negative and positive attributes that
produce bipolar sets of traits (e.g., happy vs. unhappy, arrogant
vs. humble, frequently having troubles with family members vs.
having a good relationship with family members)1. The length
of stimuli between the negative and positive counterparts was
matched, but it was not controlled within negative (or positive)
materials. This is because (a) we adopted the items from existing
questionnaires of personality, depression, anxiety, and social
functioning (see Takano et al., 2016), and (b) there should be
no or little influence of stimulus length given that we did not
impose a strict response time window. In each trial, one of the
attributes was randomly selected. Among the 100 pairs, 20 were
used in the baseline task, and the other 80 pairs were used in the
following emotional RL task. All attributes had been confirmed to
have negative or positive valence by two psychological researchers
who were unaware of the aim of the present study.
The Emotional Reversal Learning (RL) Task
Similar to the baseline task, participants were asked to choose
either the negative or positive valence option in each trial.
1These attributes were presented in the form of a phrase or sentence. Because of the
language differences, the examples are shown as if they were a single-word stimuli;
however, for example, the stimulus “happy,” was more like “(I) am happy” in the
original (Japanese) form. The full list of the stimuli is available on request from the
corresponding author.
Depending on the participants’ valence choice, a positive or
negative attribute was displayed. Participants rated to what extent
the displayed attribute was applicable to them using a five-point
Likert scale as in the baseline task. After the rating, feedback
of reward (+5 JPY) or punishment (−5 JPY) was displayed
probabilistically, depending on the valence choice (1 JPY = 0.01
USD). The task consisted of 80 trials; the first 40 trials were
the acquisition phase, in which the “negative” option was more
associated with reward than with punishment (at a 80:20%
probability); the latter half was the reversal phase, in which the
“negative” option was more associated with punishment than
with reward (at a 20:80% probability; Figure 2A). The “positive”
option had the opposite reinforcement schedule; the probabilities
of reward and punishment were 20:80% in the acquisition and
80:20% in the reversal phase. Before starting this task, participants
were informed that: (a) they would be paid the total amount of
money acquired during the task; (b) the reward and punishment
were determined by the valence choice but not by the attribute
rating2; (c) either the negative or positive valence option is more
likely to be associated with reward than punishment (and vice
versa); and (d) the contingency would be changed during the
experiment, although the timing and the number of the changes
were not mentioned. Participants were not explicitly instructed to
maximize the total amount of reward.
The Neutral Reversal Learning (RL) Task
To assess and control the general learning (and value updating)
ability, we administered the neutral RT task with non-emotional
and non-self-referent stimuli. Participants chose between the
2Providing reward/punishment feedback according to the applicability rating
would make the rating scores less reliable. If reward was provided only for an
“applicable” response, participants would be motivated to make the “applicable”
response even when the presented attribute is not applicable to them.
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FIGURE 2 | Reward and punishment schedules of Experiments 1 and 2. In Study 1 (A), participants were trained to choose negative self-reference in the first half of
the trials, following which they were prompted to shift toward positive self-reference in the reversal phase. In Study 2 (B), the contingency reversal took place twice
to train the participants to select negative, positive, and negative self-reference. The reward/punishment probabilities were opposite for the “positive” and “A” options
(e.g., 20:80 in the acquisition phase).
letters A and B, which was probabilistically rewarded and
punished as per the same reinforcement schedule that was used
in the emotional RL task. This neutral task also consisted of
80 trials; the first half was the acquisition phase, in which the
“B” option was more associated with reward than was the “A”
option; the latter half was the reversal phase, in which the
“A” option was more associated with reward than was the “B”
option. Participants were informed that (a) they would be paid
the total amount of money that they acquired in this task and
in the emotional RL task, and that (b) the reward-punishment
feedback is probabilistically determined by the A–B choice. As
in the emotional RL task, they were not explicitly instructed to
maximize the total amount of reward.
Procedure
Participants were invited to the laboratory individually.
On arrival, they provided written informed consent. First,
participants completed the baseline task, following which they
completed the emotional and neutral RL tasks. The order of
the emotional and neutral RL tasks was counterbalanced across
participants. Finally, the participants completed a self-report
questionnaire to measure depressive symptoms, and were
debriefed and paid the amount of money acquired during the
RL tasks. All study protocols were approved by the Ethical
Committee for Experimental Research on Human Subjects of the
University of Tokyo.
Statistical Analyses
We employed the Q-learning model (Watkins and Dayan, 1992;
Sutton and Barto, 1998) to extract specific features (i.e., learning
rate) of the participants’ individual learning processes in the
reversal learning tasks. The Q-learning model assumes that
the participants’ choice behavior is determined by outcome
predictions of choosing either of the two options (i.e., negative
vs. positive self-references, in the emotional RL task; B and A in
the neutral task). The outcome predictions are updated in each
trial by the difference between the actual outcome (reward or
punishment) and expected value of the chosen option, namely
the prediction error of the Rescorla-Wagner rule. In our model
of the emotional RL task, the updating processes of the outcome
predictions were represented as follows:
For trials in which negative self-reference was chosen:
Qneg(t + 1) = Qneg(t)+ αneg(R(t)− Qneg(t))
For trials in which positive self-reference was chosen:
Qpos(t + 1) = Qpos(t)+ αpos(R(t)− Qpos(t))
where Qneg (t + 1) and Qpos (t + 1) are the outcome predictions
of the two choice options (negative and positive self-reference)
at trial t + 1. These outcome predictions are determined by the
prediction error represented by the difference between the actual
reward, R(t), and the outcome prediction, Qneg(t) or Qpos(t) at
the previous trial, t. Unlike the original Q-learning model, we
assumed two learning rates (i.e., αneg and αpos) that may be
different between the “negative” and “positive” options (double
update model; cf. Schlagenhauf et al., 2014). Previous studies
have proposed variants of the Q-learning model depending on
the tasks and stimuli; for example, assuming different learning
rates between rewarded and punished trials (e.g., Dombrovski
et al., 2010) and between chosen and unchosen options (e.g.,
Li and Daw, 2011; Schlagenhauf et al., 2014), and temporally
variable learning rates over trials (Bai et al., 2014). The current
assumption of the differential learning rates was motivated
by the hypothesis that individuals with depressive symptoms
would have difficulty in updating the outcome predictions,
particularly for negative self-reference. A low learning rate of the
“negative” option reflects a slow-down in updating the outcome
prediction for negative self-reference because the prediction error
at the previous trial has only a small influence on the current
outcome prediction. Conversely, a high learning rate indicates
that the outcome prediction changes easily in response to
prediction error, which results in a quick switch between the two
options after the contingency reversal. Importantly, under this
assumption, outcome predictions were updated independently
for negative and positive self-reference. Since each updating
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process is solely coded by the corresponding (either negative or
positive) learning rate (and exploitation parameter), the learning
trajectory of negative and positive self-reference can be described
separately. Initial values of the Q parameters were determined
by the proportions of “negative” and “positive” choices in the
baseline task, which reflect the preference for negative or positive
self-reference that each participant originally had.
The probability of choosing the “negative” option at trial t is
then represented by a sigmoid function of the difference in the
outcome predictions between the negative and positive options:
Pneg(t) = 11− exp(−β(Qneg(t)− Qpos(t)))
where β is an exploration-exploitation parameter, which reflects
the reinforcement history, with a larger value indicating greater
sensitivity to the Q difference between the two options.
This Q-learning model was fitted to the observed choice
behaviors of each participant individually. The optimal values
of αneg , αpos, and β were searched by the log maximum
likelihood estimation, in which we calculated the log-sum of the
probabilities that the model would select the option that the
participant actually selected at trial t [P(choice t)]. Thus, the log
likelihood [log(L)] was presented as follows:
log(L) =
∑
t
log(P(choicet))
The log-likelihood was maximized by the Broyden–Fletcher–
Goldfarb–Shanno algorithm of the R optimal function under the
“hard constraints” on the lower and upper limits of the parameter
values (0 ≤ αneg , αpos ≤ 1; e.g., Daw, 2011).
We fitted the same three-parameter Q-learning model to the
choice behaviors observed in the neutral RL task. Although we
did not expect any differences in the learning rates between the
option B and A (αB and αA, corresponding to αneg and αpos),
these parameters were separately estimated in order to compare
the results of the neutral RL task with those of the emotional RL
task. The initial values of the Q parameters were set to be zero,
because there would be no clear pre-existing preferences to the
neutral stimuli. It is to be noted that the learning parameters (i.e.,
learning rates and exploitation parameter) were not influenced
by the order of the emotional and neutral RL tasks, ts < 1.39,
ps > 0.17.
Model Comparison
The goodness of fit of the models was tested by using the Akaike’s
information criterion (AIC), presented as follows:
AIC = 2 log(L)+ 2k,
where k represents the number of free parameters. A smaller
AIC value indicates a better model fit. The AIC prefers a
parsimonious model because it includes a penalty term that
increases as a function of the number of estimated parameters.
We compared the AIC of the double update model (i.e.,
assuming αneg and αpos) to that of the single update model
(i.e., assuming equal constraints on αneg and αpos) in order
to verify that the double learning rates explain participants’
TABLE 1 | Mean negative log likelihood and AIC across participants for the single
and double update models.
Negative log
likelihood
AIC N of
participants
with AIC as
Double< Single
Double Single Double Single (N/total
sample size)
Study 1 21.14 22.00 48.28 48.00 12/39
Study 2 23.02 24.00 52.03 51.98 13/44
AIC, Akaike’s information criterion.
choice behaviors better than the single learning rate. However,
it is not necessary that all participants have a smaller AIC
for the double than the single update model. We expected
that there would be individual differences in the balance of
the learning rates of the negative and positive self-reference;
some individuals would have equal levels of the learning rates
between the “negative” and “positive” options, whereas other
individuals would have unbalanced learning rates (e.g., reduced
learning rate specifically of the “negative” option). Table 1 shows
the results of the model comparison. For approximately one-
third of the participants, the double update model explained
the data better than did the single update model, in terms of
the AIC; however, for the other participants, the single learning
rate was sufficient to explain their choice behaviors. Because
the single update model is a lower model that is nested in the
double update model, we performed the subsequent analyses
based on the estimates of the double update model; that is,
if depressive symptoms are associated with an impairment
in a general updating ability (not specific for negative or
positive self-reference), both the learning rates for negative and
positive response options should be correlated with depressive
symptoms.
Sample Size Calculation
We determined sample sizes by power analysis (G∗power; Faul
et al., 2009). Our main analyses focused on multiple regressions
predicting depressive symptoms by the six learning parameters
from the emotional (αneg , αpos, and β) and neutral RL tasks
(αB, αA, and β). According to the power analysis, a sample
size of n = 26–55 is needed to detect a medium-to-large effect
of a single regression coefficient (f2 = 0.15–0.35) under the
assumption of alpha = 0.05 and beta = 0.80. One previous
study examined reinforcement learning in non-clinical depressed
samples, showing a medium-to-large effect size for the difference
in a learning parameter between high and low depression groups
(Hedge’s g = 0.73; Kunisato et al., 2012). Based on this result, we
set the sample sizes to be approximately 40–50, which enabled us
to detect a medium-to-large effect.
Results
In the baseline task, wherein no feedback of reward and
punishment was provided, individuals with higher levels of
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depressive symptoms were more likely to choose negative self-
reference (r = 0.31, p = 0.05). Those with higher levels of
depressive symptoms rated the negative attributes to be more
applicable (r = 0.49, p < 0.01) and positive attributes to be less
applicable to them (r = −0.50, p < 0.01)3. These tendencies
were also observed in the emotional RL task (r = 0.69, p < 0.01
for negative self-reference; r = −0.38, p = 0.02 for positive
self-reference).
In the emotional RL task, all participants performed better
than chance in the acquisition and reversal phases (Table 2).
These results suggest that participants were successful at learning
the initial association between negative self-reference and reward,
and they could subsequently adapt their behavior to choose
positive self-reference in accordance with the contingency
reversal. As a possible strategy, participants could always rate
negative attributes being “not at all” applicable to themselves in
order to avoid negative self-reference (and could rate positive
attributes as not being applicable to avoid positive self-reference).
Therefore, we examined the frequency of the “not at all”
response, which was only 10.3% across all trials in the task. Thus,
participants retrieved the aspects of the self that corresponded to
the displayed self-attributes in most (90%) of the trials.
Model-based analyses showed that severity of depressive
symptoms is negatively correlated with the learning rate of
negative (i.e., αneg) but not of positive (i.e., αpos) self-reference
(Figure 3). In order to examine the influences of the learning
rate on the choice behavior and the outcome prediction across
trials, we plotted the choice frequency and the mean outcome
prediction of negative self-reference (i.e., Qneg) for individuals
3The data from five participants who always chose either the “negative” or
“positive” option over the trials were not used in calculating these correlations.
TABLE 2 | Means and SDs of choice frequencies of negative self-reference and
learning parameters in the baseline, emotional, and neutral reversal learning (RL)
tasks for Studies 1 and 2.
Study 1 (n = 39) Study 2 (n = 44)
M SD M SD
Baseline task—choice frequency 0.40 0.23 0.42 0.24
Emotional RL task
Choice frequency
Acquisition 0.81 0.11 0.78 0.15
First reversal 0.21 0.19 0.23 0.12
Second reversal – – 0.78 0.11
Learning rate—negative (αneg) 0.60 0.28 0.70 0.26
Learning rate—positive (αpos) 0.58 0.30 0.71 0.24
Exploitation (β) 12.06 11.26 8.33 8.20
Neutral RL task
Choice frequency
Acquisition 0.77 0.14 0.79 0.16
First reversal 0.21 0.14 0.23 0.15
Second reversal – – 0.79 0.14
Learning rate—B (αB) 0.69 0.28 0.74 0.23
Learning rate—A (αA) 0.52 0.30 0.66 0.30
Exploitation (β) 11.60 11.75 15.53 13.09
who had smaller and greater values (i.e., upper and lower
quartiles) of the αneg parameter (Figure 4). Individuals with lower
learning rates of negative self-reference showed a delayed shift
from negative to positive self-reference after the stimulus-reward
contingency reversal (i.e., at the 40th trial). The updating of the
outcome prediction was also delayed for the individuals with low
learning rates of negative self-reference; the outcome prediction
of negative self-reference did not reach zero (not even at the final
trial).
In the neutral RL task, all participants except for one4
performed better than chance in the acquisition and reversal
phases (Table 1). We found no significant correlations between
the levels of depressive symptoms and the choice frequency of the
“B” option (|r| s < 0.22, for the acquisition and reversal phases)
and the model-based learning parameters (|r| s < 0.11, for αB,
αA, and β). These results suggest that individual differences in
depressive symptoms do not significantly affect performance in
the neutral RL task.
Next, we performed a regression analysis, in which depressive
symptoms were predicted by all the six learning parameters
from the emotional and neutral RL tasks. Some of the learning
parameters were moderately correlated with each other (r= 0.58,
for αneg and αpos; r = 0.52, for αB and αA); therefore, the unique
association between depressive symptoms and the learning rate
of negative self-reference needs to be tested after controlling for
the inter-parameter correlations. The results (Table 3, Model 1)
revealed that the learning rate of negative self-reference remained
a significant predictor, whereas other learning parameters did not
have significant effects on depressive symptoms. These results
suggest that the difficulty in updating outcome predictions is
more outspoken for negative self-reference than for positive and
neutral stimuli.
Finally, we examined the mediational role of the applicability
of self-attributes in the relationship between the low learning
rate of negative self-reference and depressive symptoms. Because
the low learning rate of negative self-reference increases the
chance to be confronted with negative aspects of self, it would
reinforce one’s negative self-view and be further associated
with depressive symptoms. To test this possibility, we first
calculated correlations between the learning rate of negative
self-reference and the average rating scores (applicability) of
negative and positive self-attributes. The learning rate of negative
self-reference had a marginally significant correlation with the
applicability of negative (r = −0.27, p = 0.09) but not positive
self-attributes (r = 0.08, p = 0.64). Second, we estimated a
regression model similar to Model 1, in which the applicability
of negative and positive self-attributes were added to predict
depressive symptoms. The results (Table 3, Model 2) showed that
the applicability of negative self-attributes was the only significant
predictor, which deprived the explanatory power of the learning
rate of negative self-reference. The indirect effect (Baron and
Kenny, 1986; Preacher and Hayes, 2008), which was calculated
by multiplying (a) the effect of the learning rate of negative
4This participant had 82.5 and 52.5% of “B” choices in the acquisition and reversal
phases, respectively. However, results remained unchanged after eliminating the
data pertaining to this participant.
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FIGURE 3 | Correlations between depressive symptoms and the learning rates of negative (A) and positive self-reference (B), and the exploitation parameter (C) in
Study 1. The depressive symptoms score (the CES-D score) was log transformed.
FIGURE 4 | Frequency of negative choice and average outcome predictions
of negative self-reference in Study 1. (A) Illustrates the average choice
frequencies of negative self-reference for individuals from the upper (red) and
lower quartiles (blue) of the learning rate of negative self-reference (i.e., αneg).
(B) Shows the average outcome predictions of negative self-reference (Qneg)
for the same individuals (standard errors are shown in the gray field).
self-reference on the applicability of negative self-attributes and
(b) the effect of the applicability of negative self-attributes on
depressive symptoms, was −0.385 (p = 0.097; 95% CI [−0.972,
0.079] estimated by bootstrapping of 1000-time resampling).
Although the indirect effect was only marginally significant, this
result suggests that self-verification can at least in part explain
the delayed update of the prediction outcome of negative self-
reference in individuals with depressive symptoms.
Discussion
Study 1 examined the individual differences of depressive
symptoms in reward-guided learning of emotional self-reference.
In the baseline task, individuals with higher levels of depressive
symptoms showed a greater preference for negative self-
reference, which replicates the findings of previous studies that
suggested excessive negativity bias and a lack of positivity bias
in depression (e.g., Mezulis et al., 2004). Regardless of these
differences in the baseline preference, all individuals successfully
learned the association between positive self-reference and
reward after the reversal of the stimulus-reward contingencies in
terms of the choice frequency of negative self-reference. However,
as we hypothesized, individuals with higher levels of depressive
symptoms had lower learning rates of negative self-reference,
implying that those individuals have difficulty adjusting their
outcome predictions of negative self-reference to the volatility of
the action-outcome contingencies.
We also found a correlation (although only marginally
significant) between the learning rate of negative self-reference
and the applicability of negative self-attributes. Furthermore,
the applicability of negative self-attributes had a mediating
role (again marginally significant) in the association between
impaired updating and depressive symptoms; that is, people with
difficulty in updating the reward prediction of negative self-
reference also tended to have negative self-views and, at the same
time, tended to suffer from increased depressive symptoms. This
mediation could be interpreted as indicating that a low learning
rate increases the chance to be exposed to negative self-affirmative
information. This could, on its turn, reinforce negative self-views
and lead to depressive symptoms (e.g., Evraire and Dozois, 2011).
However, it should be noted that the small sample size of Study
1 may have limited the power to detect the statistical significance
for this mediation.
One important limitation of Study 1 was that the
stimulus-reward contingencies were changed only once
across the trials. Therefore, the emotional RL task could not
fully capture the process in which participants, particularly those
with higher levels of depressive symptoms, increase the reward
expectancy of negative self-reference. Since individuals with
higher levels of depressive symptoms had greater preference for
negative self-reference in the baseline task, they mostly chose
negative self-reference in the first trial of the emotional RL task.
These individuals did not need to newly learn and establish
the association between negative self-reference and reward
in the acquisition phase. Thus, it is possible that the learning
parameters estimated in Study 1 might not reflect the process
of learning the association between negative self-reference and
reward.
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STUDY 2
In order to overcome the just mentioned limitation of Study 1,
we modified the emotional RL task by adding a second reversal
phase, wherein negative self-reference is more associated with
reward than with punishment, and positive self-reference is more
associated with punishment than with reward (Figure 2B). In
this setting, all participants had to learn (a) the association
between positive self-reference and reward in the first reversal
phase, and (b) the association between negative self-reference
and reward in the second reversal phase. The initial choice in
each reversal phase is determined by the learned contingencies
in the previous phase (e.g., the first choice in the second reversal
phase should be “positive,” which was reinforced in the first
reversal phase); therefore, we could examine the process of
shifting from positive to negative self-reference independent
of the preference that the participants originally exhibited. In
line with the results of Study 1, we predicted that individuals
with higher levels of depressive symptoms would have lower
learning rates (i.e., slower value update) for negative self-
reference.
Method
Participants and Procedures
Forty-four participants (23 men and 21 women; mean
age = 19.4 years, SD = 1.2 years) were recruited from a
large sample pool of undergraduate students from the University
of Tokyo. The procedure of Experiment 2 was identical to that
of Experiment 1 except for the reinforcement schedule in the
RL tasks (Figure 2): the first one-third of the trials (26 trials)
were the acquisition phase, in which the “negative” option was
associated with 80% of reward and 20% of punishment; the
second one-third of the trials were the first reversal phase, in
which the “negative” option was associated with 20% of reward
and 80% of punishment; and the last one-third of the trials
were the second reversal phase, in which the “negative” option
was again associated with 80:20% of reward and punishment.
Therefore, the stimulus-reward contingencies were reversed
twice across the 78 trials. All participants completed the baseline
task without reward/punishment feedback (20 trials), following
which they completed the emotional and neutral RL tasks in
a counterbalanced order. It is to be noted that the learning
parameters (learning rates and exploitation parameter) were not
influenced by the task order, ts < 1.50, ps > 0.14. The mean
CES-D score was 12.8 (SD = 8.5) and the Cronbach’s alpha was
0.86. Fourteen participants showed a level of symptoms above
the clinical cutoff (>15) of the CES-D.
Results and Discussion
In the baseline task, individuals with higher levels of depressive
symptoms chose negative self-reference more frequently
(r = 0.44, p < 0.01), which indicates that those individuals had
greater preference for negative self-reference before engaging
in the learning tasks. Furthermore, they rated the negative
attributes to be more applicable (rs = 0.70 and 0.69, p < 0.01,
in the baseline and emotional RL tasks, respectively) and the
positive attributes to be less applicable to themselves (rs=−0.51
and −0.59, p < 0.01 in the baseline and emotional RL tasks,
respectively).
In the emotional RL task, all except for three participants5
performed better than chance in the acquisition, first reversal, and
second reversal phases (Table 2). Similar to Study 1, we examined
the frequency of the “not at all” responses in the self-applicability
rating, which was only 9.5% in Study 2. This result suggests that
in most trials, participants endorsed the aspects of the self that
correspond to the presented rating stimuli.
Regardless of the differences in the choice frequency between
Experiments 1 and 2, the model-based analyses replicated
the associations between depressive symptoms and learning
parameters. We used the same Q-learning model as in Study 1, in
order to estimate the learning rates and exploitation parameters
5Results remained unchanged after excluding the data of these participants.
Similarly, in the neutral RL task, six participants failed to exceed a chance level.
These data did not influence the results.
TABLE 3 | Multiple regressions predicting the severity of depressive symptoms (log-transformed) by learning parameters of the emotional and neutral reversal learning
(RL) tasks (Model 1) and rating scores of self-attributes (Model 2) in Study 1.
Model 1 Model 2
B 95% CI p B 95% CI p
Emotional RL task
Learning rate—negative (αneg) −1.03 [−1.97, −0.08] 0.03 −0.58 [−1.37, 0.20] 0.14
Learning rate—positive (αpos) 0.45 [−0.39, 1.30] 0.28 0.14 [−0.55, 0.84] 0.68
Exploitation (β) −0.01 [−0.03, 0.01] 0.43 0.00 [−0.02, 0.02] 0.91
Neutral RL task
Learning rate—B (αB) −0.36 [−1.21, 0.50] 0.41 −0.25 [−0.95, 0.46] 0.48
Learning rate—A (αA) 0.06 [−0.79, 0.91] 0.88 0.22 [−0.47, 0.91] 0.52
Exploitation (β) 0.01 [−0.01, 0.03] 0.27 0.00 [−0.01, 0.02] 0.78
Applicability ratings
Negative self-attributes – – – 0.67 [0.29, 1.05] <0.01
Positive self-attributes – – – −0.05 [−0.43, 0.33] 0.80
R2 0.22 0.53
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FIGURE 5 | Correlations between depressive symptoms and the learning rate of negative (A) and positive self-reference (B), and the exploitation parameter (C) in
Study 2. The depressive symptoms score (the CES-D score) was log transformed.
(i.e., αneg, αpos, and β). As we hypothesized, the learning rate
of negative self-reference was the only parameter that was
significantly correlated with depressive symptoms (Figure 5). To
visualize the choice behaviors and outcome predictions across
trials, we plotted the average choice frequency of negative self-
reference and mean Qneg values for individuals with lower and
higher learning rates of negative self-reference (Figure 6). The
lower learning rate of negative self-reference was associated
with slower update of the outcome predictions of negative self-
reference6.
In the neutral RL task, most of the participants performed
better than chance in all the three learning phases, although
six participants failed to exceed a chance level either in the
acquisition or in the first reversal phase. Similar to the results
of Experiment 1, none of the choice frequency (|r| s < 0.24,
ps > 0.12) and learning parameters (|r| s < 0.08, ps > 0.60)
were significantly correlated with depressive symptoms. These
null correlations suggest that individual differences in depressive
symptoms did not significantly affect the learning process for the
neutral stimuli.
We also performed a regression analysis predicting depressive
symptoms by the six learning parameters of the emotional and
neutral RL tasks to control the inter-parameter correlations
(Table 4, Model 1). The results showed that the learning rate
of negative self-reference was the only significant predictor of
depressive symptoms. These results replicate and extend the
findings from Study 1, suggesting that depressive symptoms
6The low αneg value was also associated with delayed update of the outcome
predictions of negative self-reference in the second reversal phase. However, this
delay did not appear to influence the choice behavior itself (Figure 5A), because
the re-learning process after the second contingency reversal is mainly controlled
by the learning rate of positive, instead of negative self-reference. In several initial
trials of the second reversal phase, participants mostly continued to select the
positive option as it had been associated with reward in the first reversal phase.
Thus, the outcome prediction is more frequently updated for the positive than
negative option under the current Q-learning model assumption (the outcome
prediction is updated only for the chosen option); in other words, the choice
behaviors in the second reversal phase are dominantly influenced by the increase in
reward prediction for the positive option. Our results showed that the learning rate
of the positive option is not associated with depressive symptoms; therefore, the
process of re-learning the association between positive self-reference and reward
should not be altered even in individuals with high levels of depressive symptoms.
are associated with delayed update of outcome predictions of
negative self-reference, even when the task included a second
reversal phase that required shifting from positive to negative
self-reference.
Finally, we tested the mediational effects of the applicability
of negative and positive self-attributes on the relationship
between the low learning rate of negative self-reference and
depressive symptoms. We found significant correlations between
the learning rate of negative self-reference and the average
rating scores (applicability) of the negative (r = −0.35,
p = 0.02) and positive self-attributes (r = 0.30, p = 0.04). An
additional regression analysis revealed that the applicability of the
negative and positive self-attributes were significant predictors of
depressive symptoms, which reduced the explanatory power of
the learning rate of negative self-reference to a non-significant
level (Table 4, Model 2). The indirect effect of the learning rate
of negative self-reference on depressive symptoms was −0.527
(p= 0.035; 95%CI [−1.493,−0.152], estimated by bootstrapping
of 1000-time resampling) mediated by negative self-attributes,
and −0.267 (p = 0.109; 95%CI [−0.860, −0.016]) mediated by
positive self-attributes7. These results suggest the mediational
role of a negative self-image in the association between the
low learning rate and depressive symptoms; that is, people
with updating difficulties seem to be faced with negative self-
affirmative information, which may lead to negative self-image
and depressive symptoms.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research provides empirical evidence for the learning
hypothesis of the self-negativity bias in depression, stating
that individuals with depressive symptoms have difficulty in
adjusting their outcome predictions of negative self-reference to
the volatility of the environment. The two studies consistently
showed a significant correlation between depressive symptoms
and a low learning rate of negative self-reference, which
represents a significant delay in updating the outcome predictions
7These mediation effects are estimated in a single model with multiple mediators
(i.e., the negative and positive self-applicability ratings).
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FIGURE 6 | Frequency of negative choice and average outcome predictions
of negative self-reference in Study 2. (A) Presents the average choice
frequencies of negative self-reference for individuals from the upper (red) and
lower quartiles (blue) of the learning rate of negative self-reference (i.e., αneg).
(B) Shows the outcome predictions of negative self-reference (Qneg) for the
same individuals (standard errors are shown in the gray field).
of negative self-reference after the reversal of stimulus-reward
contingencies. Our findings shed new light on the possible
learning mechanism underlying the self-negativity bias in
individuals with depressive symptoms. Existing theories and
research have exclusively focused on dysfunctions in attention
and (working) memory, suggesting that depressive cognitions
can be characterized by impaired attentional disengagement from
and impoverished inhibitory control of negative self-referent
information processing (e.g., Gotlib and Joormann, 2010). This
cognitive account of depression provides a good theoretical
basis, explaining why it is difficult for depressed people to
stop negative thinking once it has started. However, until now,
it was still unclear why those individuals voluntarily engaged
in and often preferred negative to positive self-reference even
when it brings harmful consequences (Coyne, 1976; Swann
et al., 1992; Giesler et al., 1996). In the present studies,
we showed that individuals with depressive symptoms are
inflexible in updating and adjusting their outcome predictions
of negative self-reference in a volatile environment in which
the outcome of negative self-reference is variable over time.
This result implies that those individuals tend to keep a
high reward-expectancy for negative self-reference even after
the reversal of the actual action-outcome contingencies, which
support the persistent belief that negative self-reference is
more rewarding (and more preferred) than positive self-
reference.
The difficulty in updating outcome predictions of negative
self-reference was associated with the extent to which one
possesses negative self-images. Both Studies 1 and 2 showed
(marginally) significant negative correlations between the
learning rate of negative self-reference and the applicability
of negative self-attributes. Follow-up mediation analyses
(particularly in Study 2) indicated an indirect effect of the low
learning rate on depressive symptoms via negative self-attributes.
The low learning rate of negative self-reference increases the
chance to be faced with negative aspects of self, which may result
in depressive symptoms. However, it could also be the other
way around. More precisely, people with depressive symptoms
may have a higher motivation to persist in approaching negative
self-referent information and therefore refrain from updating
on the basis of reward predictions. The self-verification theory
of depression indeed holds that confirmation of one’s self-image
promotes a sense of self-coherence and fosters the perception
that one is true to oneself (Swann et al., 1992; Giesler et al.,
1996). In line with these arguments, a recent study showed
that individuals with higher levels of depressive symptoms have
greater preference toward negative self-reference; conversely,
those with lower levels of depressive symptoms tend to avoid
negative self-reference even though they lose an opportunity
to obtain a monetary reward by doing so (Takano et al., 2016).
Facing non-self-affirmative information would be a relatively
aversive experience that arouses a sense of self-discrepancy and
TABLE 4 | Multiple regressions predicting the severity of depressive symptoms (log-transformed) by learning parameters of the emotional and neutral reversal learning
(RL) tasks (Model 1) and rating scores of self-attributes (Model 2) in Study 2.
Model 1 Model 2
B 95% CI p B 95% CI p
Emotional RL task
Learning rate—negative (αneg) −1.43 [−2.78, −0.09] 0.04 −0.44 [−1.46, 0.58] 0.39
Learning rate—positive (αpos) 0.41 [−0.97, 1.79] 0.55 0.30 [−0.70, 1.3] 0.55
Exploitation (β) 0.00 [−0.02, 0.03] 0.74 0.01 [−0.02, 0.03] 0.62
Neutral RL task
Learning rate—B (αB) −0.25 [−1.15, 0.65] 0.58 −0.48 [−1.13, 0.17] 0.14
Learning rate—A (αA) 0.99 [−0.36, 2.34] 0.14 0.70 [−0.27, 1.67] 0.15
Exploitation (β) −0.01 [−0.03, 0.02] 0.63 0.00 [−0.02, 0.01] 0.55
Ratings
Negative self-attributes – – – 0.70 [0.34, 1.06] <0.01
Positive self-attributes – – – −0.40 [−0.75, −0.06] 0.02
R2 0.15 0.59
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triggers an avoidance reaction, for example, when individuals
with depressive symptoms have to rate positive attributes (e.g.,
“Happy”) as being “not applicable to me.” Thus, it is possible
that rating self-attributes per se would be an extra reward and/or
extra punishment, by confirming negative and disconfirming
positive self-images for individuals with depressive symptoms
(cf. Watson et al., 2008). It is, however, important to note that we
relied on a cross-sectional design in both studies. We therefore
cannot specify the causal directions of the detected mediation8.
Also note that some effects included in the mediation were only
marginally significant (e.g., the indirect effect of the learning rate
in Study 1). Replication and extension are thus needed with more
rigorous (e.g., longitudinal) designs to establish the mediational
association.
The avoidance mechanism is worth mentioning here for
another reason. In our task, participants could avoid positive self-
reference by choosing negative self-reference. In this respect, it
is of special interest that the Q-learning model assumes that the
outcome prediction of an unchosen option is not updated, which
means that avoiding positive self-reference maintains low levels
of reward expectancy of positive self-reference (however, see e.g.,
Schlagenhauf et al., 2014, for variants of the Q-learning model).
This might be a good analogy to the avoidance mechanisms at
play in depression (e.g., Jacobson et al., 2001; Ramnerö et al.,
2015): inactivity and avoidance in depression are argued to
reduce the opportunity to experience circumstances that would
lead to environmental reward and reinforcement5.
It is worth noting that, across the two studies, we found
no significant association between depressive symptoms and the
learning rate for positive self-reference9. This null association
suggests that the reward-guided learning of positive self-reference
may not be disturbed in individuals with depressive symptoms,
and thus, that those individuals can come to choose positive
instead of negative self-reference given a high enough number of
reinforced trials. This valence-specific effect should be interpreted
with caution though. First, one might argue that a single (but
not double) learning rate would be sufficient to describe the
participants choice behavior (see Model Comparison) and that
the current results can be attributed to a general deficit in the
updating function that is not specific for negative self-reference.
However, the following arguments go against this criticism: (a)
the model with a single learning rate is nested in the model
with two learning rates, so if the single learning rate would
have provided a more appropriate fit for a given participant, the
estimates for the two learning rates should have been more or less
equal as in the two-learning-rate model; (b) if a general deficit is at
8We also tested a “feedback” model with the reversed path direction, i.e., depressive
symptoms -> negative self-attributes -> the learning rate. Here, the indirect effect
was −0.01 (p = 0.88, 95%CI [−0.14, 0.11]) in Study 1 and −0.05 (p = 0.26,
95%CI [−0.16, 0.04]) in Study 2. These null effects suggest that our hypothesized
mediational association (i.e., the learning rate -> negative self-attributes ->
depressive symptoms) fits the data better than the alternative mediation with the
opposite direction.
9As additional evidence, we found that depressive symptoms are significantly
correlated with a difference score between the negative and positive learning rates
in the pooled data of Studies 1 and 2 (r = −0.24, p = 0.027). This significant
correlation suggests that depressive symptoms are associated with a large delay in
updating outcome predictions for negative relative to positive responses.
play, both the learning rates for the negative and positive response
options should have been correlated with depressive symptoms.
Second, one may argue that the lack of a control condition in
which the positive response option is initially reinforced could
be considered to give room to the alternative interpretation that
depressive symptoms are associated with a difficulty in updating
the reward predictions for the initially learned response, but
not for negative self-reference per se. However, our data of the
neutral task with the non-emotional and non-self-referent stimuli
suggests that this is not the case. Still, it would be important to
examine this alternative interpretation more directly by including
this control condition in follow-up research.
Making abstraction of these alternative interpretations,
our findings on the valence specificity could have important
implications for recent cognitive-bias-modification (CBM)
approaches, which aim to alleviate depressive symptoms by
correcting negative attentional and interpretational biases (e.g.,
Hertel and Mathews, 2011). Although the efficacy of CBM
interventions is still controversial (Hakamata et al., 2010; Hallion
and Ruscio, 2011; Beard et al., 2012; Cristea et al., 2015), our data
highlight the potential of reward-guided reinforcement learning
as a novel method to correct self-negativity bias and to enhance
self-positivity bias in depression (cf. Hertel and Mathews, 2011;
Lau, 2013). Future research could focus on how to consolidate
the learned association between positive self-reference and
reward, because that association appeared relatively fragile in the
present study (cf. the second reversal phase in Study 2).
It is tempting to consider the current results as an
indication that negative self-referent thinking is a mental habit
in depression, as discussed in the literature on depressive
rumination (Hertel, 2004; Verplanken et al., 2007; Watkins
and Nolen-Hoeksema, 2014; Ramnerö et al., 2015). Indeed, our
results showed that participants with high levels of depressive
symptoms continue to select negative self-reference even after the
contingency reversal. This result appears to be consistent with the
hypothesized “habitual” nature of depressive rumination, which
is characterized by the difficulty to oppose depressive rumination
despite its negative outcomes (Hertel, 2004). However, we should
be careful to interpret the current results as evidence for the
habitual nature of rumination because of two reasons. First,
on a conceptual level, depressive thinking or rumination is still
different from choosing a “negative” option in a decision-making
task. Second, to conclude that a behavior is a habit (Heyes
and Dickinson, 1990; de Wit and Dickinson, 2009), researchers
need to test the behavior under conditions of (a) contingency
degradation (i.e., belief criterion) and (b) outcome devaluation
(i.e., desire criterion). Although the emotional RL task taps into
the belief criterion, it does not examine whether negative self-
reference in depression meets the desire criterion, that is, whether
participants continue the reinforced response after outcome
devaluation by, for example, saturation (Valentin et al., 2007) or
instructed devaluation (de Wit et al., 2007).
Even if negative self-reference would be a habit-like behavior
that is no longer driven by the goal or desired outcome that
initially installed it, it might still be changed by identifying and
manipulating “hidden goals.” Moors et al. (in press) have indeed
proposed that a single action may have multiple outcomes. In
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our experiments, one and the same response option (or action)
might have had two goals; one obvious goal was to obtain
monetary reward, whereas another hidden goal might have
been to be consistent with negative or positive self-views. In
the first reversal phase, people with depressive symptoms, who
tend to have negative self-views, might have experienced a
conflict between these two goals, i.e., earning money but being
exposed to positive self-images. Our findings could be taken as
evidence that the latter hidden goal weakens the reinforcement
for the “positive” response for those individuals. Therefore,
we can expect that identifying and changing the hidden goal,
or manipulating the negative self-views (e.g., Serrano et al.,
2004), would be therapeutically beneficial, because engaging
in negative self-referent thinking would no longer satisfy this
hidden goal of being consistent with negative self-views. Watkins
and Nolen-Hoeksema (2014) also proposed an intervention
to reduce rumination as a mental habit, which involves the
repeated practice of using alternative coping strategies in
response to an identified habit-triggering context (e.g., when
lying in bed).
It is also important to note that we did not find any significant
associations between depressive symptoms and the learning
parameters of the neutral RL task. Previous studies using the
neutral RL task have suggested aberrant reward-punishment
sensitivity in clinical levels of depression (Murphy et al., 2003;
Taylor Tavares et al., 2008; Dombrovski et al., 2010; Robinson
et al., 2012), implying that patients with depression shift from one
to the other option more often than do healthy controls when
receiving probabilistic negative feedback (i.e., punishment after
a correct response) or when receiving unexpected reward. One
critical difference between the previous and current studies is that
our sample consisted of non-clinical university students. In our
data, around 30% of participants showed a level of depressive
symptoms above the clinical cutoff of the CES-D (>15), which is
comparable to the general prevalence rate in university students
(i.e., 30.6%, Ibrahim et al., 2013). Given the continuity of
depression between clinical and non-clinical samples (Flett et al.,
1997), we would argue that our results provide a solid basis for
linear predictions for more severe levels of depression. However,
the absolute number of participants who were at a clinical level of
depressive symptoms was relatively small in the current sample
(24 participants across two studies). Therefore, future research
should confirm this assertion in a sample of clinically depressed
people.
Another remaining question (particularly of Study 2) is
why depressive symptoms are associated with a delay in
re-learning that negative self-reference is rewarded and not
only punished. Our results (see Figure 6B, the second reversal
phase) seem to indicate that it takes a relatively long time
for people with depressive symptoms to acquire a preference
toward negative self-reference10, which might reflect a blunted
sensitivity to external reward and punishment in updating
10Note that in the acquisition phase (before any contingency reversal), people with
higher levels of depressive symptoms had already shown greater preference toward
the negative option (see also the results of the baseline tasks). These individuals
did not need to newly “learn” the association between negative self-reference and
reward in the acquisition phase.
belief about negative self-reference. However, it should be noted
that the delay that we observed here might be merely due
to the model assumption that the learning rate had to be
equal between rewarded and punished trials. This constraint
was installed because a model with four learning rates (i.e.,
negative and positive/rewarded and punished trials) had too
many free parameters (leading to a convergence issue). Since
some studies have suggested that the learning rate can be different
between rewarded and punished trials (e.g., Dombrovski et al.,
2010), future research needs to dissociate the four different
updating processes (i.e., rewarded versus punished and negative
versus positive self-reference) to specify which delay best models
depression. This could be achieved by estimating a model with
learning rates for rewarded and punished trials in an experiment
with two between-person conditions: a condition with a negative-
to-positive (i.e., learning that the negative is punished and the
positive is rewarded after the contingency reversal) and condition
with a positive-to-negative transition (i.e., learning that the
positive is punished, and the negative is rewarded after the
contingency reversal).
CONCLUSION
The present research is the first to provide evidence that
individuals with depressive symptoms have difficulty updating
their outcome predictions of negative self-reference in a
volatile environment. This inflexibility in updating outcome
predictions could contribute to excessive focus on negative
aspects of the self, that is, to self-negativity bias in depression.
Furthermore, the difficulty in updating the reward prediction
of negative self-reference is correlated with the negative self-
image that individuals with depressive symptoms often possess.
The consistency between their negative self-images and negative
self-reference (and discrepancy between their negative self-
image and positive self-reference) may be associated with
the delayed shift from negative to positive self-reference.
We believe that the reinforcement learning and model-based
approach could be a promising starting point to reveal the
mechanisms of the persistence and repetitiveness of depressive
cognitions.
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